The IAEA has submitted their report concerning Iran’s nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council.  The report will be used to either place sanctions upon Iran or not.

Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process even with an Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusion can be expected to take even longer in light of the undeclared nature of Iran’s past nuclear programme, and in particular because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment programme, the existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear programme, including, as mentioned
above, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that could involve nuclear material.

Why can’t the IAEA conclude one way or another if Iran is seeking to obtain nuclear weapons?

It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above uncertainties related to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive Agency verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties, Iran’s full transparency is still essential. Without full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol — transparency that could only be achieved through Iran’s active cooperation — the Agency’s ability to reconstruct the history of Iran’s past programme and to verify the correctness
and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge enrichment programme, will be limited, and questions about the past and current direction of Iran’s nuclear programme will continue to be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to, and cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation related to procurement and dual use equipment; and access to certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the Agency may need to visit in the future as part of its investigation.

It should be noted that Iran handed over what was termed as “key documents” to the IAEA back in October 2005.  In the course of four months the IAEA has been unable to determine what the exact stance of Iran’s nuclear program is.  This despite numerous trips to Iran’s nuclear facilities which have restarted enrichment processes.

View the entire IAEA report at Vital Perspective.
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